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[So F. No. 17248. In Bank. Oct. 28,1947.]

ELEVATOR OPERATORS AND STARTERS' UNION,
LOCAL 117, et aI., Respondents, v. FREDERICK NEWMAN, Appellant.
[So F. No. 17577. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1947.]

FREDERICK NEWMAN, Appellant, V. ELEVATOR
OPERATORS AND STARTERS' UNION, LOCAL
117, et aI., Respondents.

)

[l] Appeal-Moot Questions.-The issues involved in a controversy as to whether a former treasurer of a labor union was
entitled to reinstatement to his position became moot, on expiration pending appeal of the term of office for which he was
elected, except for his claim of back salary for that part of
his term of office that was unexpired when the union eeased
to pay his salary.
[Ill Associations-Officers-Removal. -.An unincorporated association exists to carry out policies formulated by its members,
and it has the right to remove officers who have lost the confidence of the members or who refuse to conform to the polieies established by it.
[3] Id. - Officers-Removal.-The policy that prompted the abandonment of the common-law rule restricting the removal of
eorporate directors prior to expiration of their specified terms,
;
and the adoption of Civ. Code, § 310(1), authorizing their
~. '.•.: .. removal by a vote of the shareholders, applies with equal foree
[~~.
to officers of unincorporated associations.
,< [4] Id.-Oonstitution and By-Laws-Amendment.-An amendment
to the eonstitution and by-laws of a building service employees' union providing that only members employed as elevator
operators shall be allowed "to hold office in the union with
the exception of members tllling a full ti;ue office" and a1ao
that it shall take e:IIect 30 days after its passage applies to
the unexpired terms of office as well as to officers taking office
in the future.
[5] Id. - 01!lcers-Removal-Right to Salarf. - The fact that a
union has the power to remove an officer from office prior to
expiration of the specified term for which he was elected, doee
McX. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 21; [2,3,5] AI!eociations, § 3; [4] Associations, § 4; [6] Mandamus, § 17; [7]
Pleading, § 70; Set-o:II and Counterclaim, 114; [8] Pleading, § 70;
~91 Aasociat!ons, § 12.
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not necessarily deprive him of the right to the salary for the
1IIlexpired term, since the exercise of such power of removal
eould eonstitute a breach of a contraot of employment.
[8] Kandam1l8 - Subjects of OOlltral- OOlltnct Bilhts.-Mandam1l8 does not lie where there is no eause of action for rein.utement to an oftioe, but merel7 • elaim for damages for
breach of eontract.
i ['I] Pleadin,- Oroaa-complaint: Bekif and Oountercla.im. - Subject Katter.-In an action by a labor union against its former
treasurer to recover possession of uuion books and records,
defendant's claim for back salary on the grounds that he had
• right to be reinstated as treasurer and that the union had
breached a contract of employment, was a proper subject of
a counterolaim and also a cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc.,

11438, 442.)
[8] Id. - Oross-complaint - Transaction.-The facts surrounding
the cause of action and not the form of the complaint are determinative of what constitutes the transaction within the
rules as to cross-eomplaints.
[9] Associa.tions-mtervelltion of Oourta.-A. former treasurer of
a labor union seeking reinstatement to his position and back
aalar;y for the unexpired term did not fail to emaut his rem&dies within the union before seeking judicial relief where,
pursuant to the union's eonstitutioll and by-laws, he had appealed to the general exeoutive board from the union decision vaeating his oSee, where his appeal was unconditioJ1ally
denied, and where it was apparent that an appeal to the same
board for damages would be futile.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy and
Mylvain J. Lazarus, Judges. First judgment reversed with
directions; other judgment aftlrmed.

/

Aetion by labor union and others to secure possession of
1IDion books and records, and proceeding in mandamus to compel union to admit petitioner to oftlce of treasurer and pay
him the sa1aq of such oftlce. Judgment for plainti1ls in Am
ense reversed with directions; judgment against petitioner in
second ease aftlrmed.
[8] See 18 OaLJ'ur. 791; 34 Am.Jur. 849.
[9] Ezhaustion of remedies within labor union as eondition of
resort to eourts by expelled member, note, 168 A.L.B. 1462. See,
I also, a OaL.Ju. 354; 4 Am..Jur. 472; 31 Am..Jur. 8~
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Melbert B. Adams for Appellant.
Albert Picard and Francis McCarty for Respondents.
Charles P. Scully, as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of ResponeJ.
ents.
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TRAYNOR, l.-Bespondent union (hereinafter called the
union) is an unincorporated association whose constitution
and by-laws make it an integral part of the Building Service
Employees' International Union. Appellant Newman has
been a member of the union since its organization. Be was
elected its first treasurer, and served in this capacity on a
part-time basis until the present controversy. Be was last
elected on December 14, 1943, for a two-year term expiring
December 81, 1945. Section 9 of article 4 of the constitution
and by-laws of the union pro rides that the treasurer shall be
elected for a two-year term, and that all oftlcers of the union
aha1l hold oftlce until their successors are duly elected and
qualliied. During his last term appellant received a salary
~ $70 per month, paid to him until May 15, 1944.
, . On April 11, 1944, the members of the union adopted an
amendment to the constitution and by-laws providing, "Only
members who are employed as elevator operators under the
jurisdiction of the union • • • shall be allowed to hold office
in the union with the exception of members filling a full-time
oftice. This section to become e1fective (30 days) after passage
by the membership." Previously there was no requirement
that officers of the union be employed as elevator ope~
~ra. Appellant, who was not employed as an elevator oper.;
ator, opposed the adoption of the amendment and Jefused
ihereafter to take such employment. A controversy arose betWeen him and the union as to whether he was entitled to hold
the. oftice until the end of the term for which he was elected.
:Without complying with the requirement established by the
amendment. Upon the expiration of the 80-day period the
'union declared appellant's oftlce vacant and eeaaed to pay
appellant the salary of treasurer. On May 23, 1944, a new
election was held and another member of the union was elected
treasurer. Appellant refused to yield to the election of a new
treasurer, maintaining that until the end of his term he was
the duly elected and qualified treasurer of the union and as
an incident to his oftice was entitled to draw the sa.laq ~
II c:.»-aI
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tached thereto. He refused to give up possession of the books,
records, and papers of the union in his custody. Officers of
the union, acting on behalf of the union, brought an action
against him to recover them and $5,000 damages for detention of its property. Appellant:6led a counterclaim for pay. ment of his salary. He also :6led a cross-complaint praying
for payment of his salary, for declaratory relief that he was·
the duly elected, acting, and qualified treasurer of the union,
and for an injunction to prevent the union from paying the
treasurer's salary to the newly-elected treasurer. The trial
court gave judgment for the union for the possession of the
books, records. and papers in appellant's custody. It refused ,
to award damages and struck appellant's counterclaim and
cross-complaint. It stated in its findings: "That none of the
matters set forth in the counterclaim or cross-complaint of
the defendant constitutes a counterclaim or cross-complaint
to the amended complaint herein; that subdivision (e) of
section 3 of the by-laws of the plaintitf union reads as follows:
'The treasurer shall keep all records required to be kept by
him in files provided for the purpose by the union. Such:6les
shall be kept in the office of the union.' That without regard
to whether said defendant is or is not the treasurer of said
union the said plaintitf is entitled to judgment herein for the
recovery of the personal property set forth in the amended
complaint herein; that the said counterclaim or cross-eomplaint have been stricken out by this court without prejudice
to further procedure." Defendant and cross-eomplainant
appeals.
Since the judgment in the action brought by the union faDed
to detennine whether appellant was the treasurer of the union
for the remainder of his tenn, appellant petitioned for a writ
of mandamus to compel the union to admit him "to the use
and enjoyment of the office of treasurer of respondent union
and to compel payment unto petitioner of the salary due him
as such." The trial court issued the alternative writ, which
was discharged upon trial of the ease. In its findings the trial
court stated among other things that the amendment requiring
that part-time officers of the union be employed as elevator
operators atfeeted the tenure of petitioner's office, that this
amendment was a. "legal and valid amendment of the constitution and by-laws of said union," and that petitioner was
"not entitled to the sum of seventy (70) dollars or any other
amount per month or ~ amount at all from May 15, 1944. to

\
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the date of judgment herein or for any other period." Petitioner appeals. His appeals from the judgment in the mandamus proceeding and from the judgment in the first action
have been consolidated.
[1] Since the term for which appellant was elected expired
on December 13, 1943, there is no longer any controversy as
to whether he is now entitled to reinstatement as treasurer of
the union. The issues have therefore become moot except for
appellant's claim for back salary for the part of his term of
office that was unexpired when the union ceased to pay his
salary.
Appellant contends that the back salary is due him on the
ground that he was the treasurer of the union until the end
of the term for which he was elected, that he was entitled to
reinstatement to his office, and that as an incident to his right
to reinstatement he was entitled to receive the salary connected with the office.
In his pleadings as well as in his briefs on appeal appellant
contended that the amendment is invalid on the ground that
it was not proposed to the members of the union in the manner
required by the constitution and by-laws of the union and the
international union. The trial court found in the mandamus
proceeding, however, that on April 11, 1944, the union "duly
and regularly amended" its constitution and by-laws by
adopting the amendment in question and that petitioner was
estopped from objecting to the method of adoption thereof on
the ground that for many years he had "acquiesced in said
method of amendment and voted for and assisted in the adoption of amendments of the said constitution and by-laws in
the said same manner, and that by amendments made in the
same manner the term of office of treasurer was increased
from one (1) year to two (2) years while petitioner held said
office, and in the same manner an amendment was adopted \
pursuant to which respondent union increased the salary of i
petitioner during his term of office and said petitioner accepted
the increased salary and did not contend that the amendment pursuant to which the union so acted was not valid or
make any objections to the adoption thereof." In the course
of the appellate proceedings appellant waived his objection
to the manner of adoption of this amendment. We assume,
therefore, that the amendment was properly adopted.
Appellant relies on cases holding that an officer of an
uninoorporaed association elected for a specified term of

)
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ofIlce cannot be removed from hisofllce upon charges brought
against him without having been given notice of the charges
and an opportunity to reply thereto. (Be1I.tleg v. Hurley,
222 Mo.App. 51 [299 S.W. 604]; Goller v. Stubenhaw, 77
Mise 29 [184 N.T.S. 1001, 1050]; see C.J.S.) Respond.
ents contend that it is immaterial whether appellant could
have been removed from. his ofIlce for alleged misconduct
without adequate cause and proper investigation, since the
amendment merely placed a condition upon his continuance
in ofIlce that was reasonably connected with the purposes
of the union, and that rights to an office of an unincorporated
association are subject to the right· of the association to
amend its by.laws to alter the terms and conditions of hold·
ing the office. In Fugure v. MufuG'l Society 01 Sf. /ol6pA,
4:6 Vt. 362, 368, cited by respondents, the court recognized
that plaintiff'8 right to a widow's allowance of 25 cents per
day under the by·laws of an unincorporated association was
validly limited by an amendment to the by-laws, adopted
after plaintUf's husband joined the association, whereby a
ceiling was placed on the amount of allowance available to
a widow. The court based its holding, however, on the charitable character of the allowances, stating that they "were
derived solely from voluntary assessments upon the members
of the society.••• And experience might prove that, without
assessments greater than the members could bear, there
must .be a limitation to the stipend to the widows." This
case can hardly be regarded as a precedent with regard to
rights not based on charitable contributions. In StoAr v.
San FramMco Mwicol Fund 80ciet1/, 82 Cal. 557, 560[22
P. 1125], on which respondents also rely, an unincorporated
association amended its by.laws regarding the period for
which members were entitled to siekness benefits ~ plainti1! had become m. It was held that plaintiif's right to benefits was a contract right, which under the terms of the contract was subject to changes without his consent, since the
by-laws reserved the power to the membe1'8 to amend them:
and that the rule of law allowing such amendments "must
be held to enter into and form a part of the contract." (82
Cal. 557, 560.) The decision in that case was based on the
fact, however, that the by.laws did not specify the period
during which a member was to receive siekness benefits. The
court clearly distinguished the case from cases in which the
member had acquired a right to siekness benefits for a speci-
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fied period of time. (82 Cal.. 557, 561-562.) Since appellant's term of oflice was specified in the constitution and bylaws of the union, there is no basis for applying the holding
in Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Society. supra.
Nor do Bowie v. Grand Lodge, 99 Cal. 392 [34 P. 103], or
Robinson v. Temp'kJr Lodge, 117 Cal 370 [49 P. 170, 59 Am.
St.Rep. 193], also relied on by respondents, support the contention that a right acquired under the by-laws of an unincorporated association can be retroactively defeated by an
amendment to the by-laws even though the right was definitely
defined and acquired before the adoption of the amendment
to the by-laws, and no power was reserved to the members
either by a special provision in the by-laws or by a rule of
law to affect that right. (See, also, "Wist v. Grtmd Lodge, 22
Ore. 271 [29 P. 610, 29 Am.St.Rep. 603] ; 7 C.l.S. 34.)
[9] There is an important difrerence, however, betweeD
a right of a member of an unincorporated association under
the constitution and by-laws of an association to receive benefits and the right of an officer for a specified term to hold
the oflice to which he was elected. An unincorporated usociation exists to carry out policies formulated by the majority
of its members. The right of the members to determine policies would be vitiated if omcers could continue in oflice even
though a conflict developed between them and the members
over policy. If an officer had a vested right to his oftlce, superior even to the power of the members to amend the ecmstimtion and by-laws, he would represent the association evm
. . . though he opposed the policies of its members or lacked the
!{ very qualifications the members require as a matter of poHq.
~,
The law does not prevent one who has appointed an agent
~1 for a specified term from revoking the agency. (Civ. Code,
f § 2356; Long Beach Drug Co. v. Vnited Drug Co., IS Cal.2d
.;: 158, 174 [88 P.2d 698, 89 P.2d 3861; Stoll v. Stoll. 5 Cal.2d
687, 691 [56 P.2d 226J; 1 Cal.Jur. 702; Rest., Agency,
f~ § 118 (b).) There is even more reason to allow an unmcor~ .. porated association to remove oftlcers who have lost the con·
fidence of the members or who refase to conform to the
. policies established by the association. [8] Appellant refers
to the fact, however, that labor unions have grown in strength
of recent years, and contends that they should have no greater
power in the removal of oftlcers than corporations have in
the removal of directors. He relies on the common-law rule

r:
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that in the absence of a provision in the by-laws authorizing
the shareholders of a corporation to shorten the term of office
of directors, they have no power, except for cause, to remove
directors before the expiration of their specified terms. (Ballantine, Corporations, 2d ed. 434; 2 Fletcher, Cys. Corp.,
§§ 352, 356, 357.) There was no such rule at common law
with regard to the officers of unincorporated associations.
There is no reason now to adopt such a rule for such associations, for the common-law rule has been changed for corporations in this state. The rule as it applied to corporations
was criticized as unsound on the ground that "the shareholders, although the sovereign owners, must submit to the
control of their corporation being retained by the elected
directors during their term of office, even though they have
become entirely unsatisfactory." (Ballantine, ibid., 434.) This
state abandoned the rule by providing in section 310(1) of
the Civil Code: "The entire board of directors or any individual director may be removed from office by a vote of
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote at an election of directors." Other states
have adopted similar statutes. (Ballantine, ibid., 435.) The
policy that prompted abandoning the common-law rule as to
the removal of corporate directors applies with equal force
to officers of unincorporated associations.
[4] Appellant contends that the amendment should be
interpreted as applying only to part-time officers taking
office after its passage, since a by-law, like a statute, will not
be construed to operate retrospectively unless it expressly
so provides. (See 6A Cal.Jur. 323.) It appears from the
terms of the amendment, however, that it applies to the unexpired terms of officers holding office 88 well as to officers
taking office in the future, for it provides that it shall take
effect 30 days after its passage and that only members employed 88 elevator operators shall be allowed "to hold any
office in the union with the exception of members filling a
full time office." (Italics added.) Moreover, those who proposed the amendment and assisted in its adoption have con:rtrued it 88 applying to officers holding office at the time of
! the adoption of the amendment 88 well 88 to officers taking
o1TIP.e subsequently thereto. The two part-time officers besides appellant who were not employed 88 elevator operators voted for the amendment and resigned during the
30-day period specified by the amendment.
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[6] It does not follow, however, that appellant is not
entitled to back salary because the union had power to remove
bim from office. Even though he was not entitled to reinstatement to his office and to his salary as an incident to hold·
ing the office, the exercise of the power to remove him from
his office before the expiration of the specified term for which
he was elected could constitute a breach of a contract of em·
ployment. As this court said with regard to the revocation of
the authority of an agent: "Save in the case of an agency
coupled with an interest, a principal has the power to revoke
an agent's authority at any time before the agent has completed performance. (Civ. Code, sec. 2536; 1l'Zanaga/I/, v. Brown,
70 Cal. 254 [11 P. 706]; Parke v. Frank, 75 Cal. 364 [17 P.
427]; Blumenthal v. Gooilall, 89 Cal. 251 [26 P. 906] j 1 Cal.
Jur. p. 705.) A principal may, however, curtail his righ~ of
revocation by contracting not to revoke the authority for a
definite time. If the principal does so contract, he still retains
the power to terminate the agency, and the termination cannot be prevented by the agent, but a revocation of authority
within the designated period renders the principal1iable for
damages for the violation of a legal right of tha :tgent, just
as in the case of any other breach of contract. (Parke v.
Frank, supra; BlumenthaZ v. GooilaZl, supra; Ropes v. John
Rosenfeld', Son" 145 Cal. 671 [79 P. 354]; 8ill v. Oeschi, 167
Cal. 698 [140 P. 949] j Boehm v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 239 [191
P. 5]." (Roth v. Moeller, 185 Cal. 415, 418 [197 P. 62] ; Stoll
v. Stoll, 5 Ca1.2d 687, 691 [56 P.2d226] ; Long Beach Drug 00.
v. United Drug 00., 13 Cal2d 158, 174 [88 P.2d 698, 89 P.2d
386]; see 2 l:lechem, Agency, § 568.) In some states statutes
empower banks or other private corporations to dismiss ofl\.
cera or other employees at pleasure. There is a eonftt'ct of
authority whether such a statute, in the absence of special
provisions, should be construed to mean that the corporation
can exercise its power of removal only subject to liability for
damages to omcers or employees employed for specified terms.
(Ooa: v. First Nat. Bank, 10 CalApp.2d 302, 305 [52 P.2d
524] ; In r6 Paramount Publia: Oorp., 90 F.2d 441 [111 A.L.R.
889] and cases there cited; see Ballantine, Corporations, 2d
ed. 437; 39 Colum.L.Rev. 353; 50 Harv.L.Rev. 418; 47 Yale
L.J. 1(Y19. 1081; Unif. Business Corp. Act, § 32.)
The question arises in the present case whether the rule
empowering an unincorporated association to remove omcers
elected for a special term makes the contract of employment
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implied in the election to office terminable at the pleasure of
the association, in the absence of a special contract that the
officer will be employed for the term for which he was elected.
There is also the question whether appellant had a right to a
fixed salary or whether his salary was subject to the discretion of the union. The constitution and by-laws of the union
provide that ccThe salaries of officera and committees shall,
upon the recommendation of the Executive Boal'd, be fixed
And determined by the Union" (Art. IV, § 5.) It is contended that the salaries can be revised upward or downward
at any time and that since the union could have decided that
the oftlce should carry no salary, appellant cannot recover
damages. This court cannot determine these questions on this
appeal.
[6] Appellant's claim for back salary was tried only in
the mandamus proceeding. His claim was based, not on breach
of contract, but on the theory that he had a right to reinstatement to the office. It ill settled that mandamus does not lie
when there is no cause of action for reinstatement to a position, but merely a claim for damages for breach of contract.
(I",ins v. (hason, 19 Cal.2d 14, 16 [118 P.2d 812] ; McPherson v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal.2d 748, 749 [68 P.2d 707];
Northrup v. Baynes, 15 Cal.App.2d 665,666 [59 P.2d 1056];
Coombs v. Smith, 17 Cal.2d 454, 455 [62 P.2d 3BO); aee
34 Am.Jur. 849.)
[7] In the action brought by the union, appellant based
his claim for back salary in his cross-complaint not only on
the ground that he had a right to be reinstated as treasurer and
that back salary was due him as an incident to that right, but
also on the ground that the union had breached a contract of
employment. Such a claim was a proper subject of a counterclaim and a cross-complaint. "Under the 1927 amendments to
section 438, Code of Civil Procedure, the sole requisites of a
counterclaim are that it 'must tend to diminish or defeat the
plaintiff's recovery and must exist in favor of a defendant
and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment
might be had in the action.' Terry Trading Corp. v. Barksy,
210 Cal. 428 [292 P. 474] ; Luse v. Peter" ante, p. 625 [28
P.2d 857]. Upon counterclaim a defendant may recover damages exceeding the plainti1f's demand. (Sees. 626, 666, 857&,
Code Civ. Proc.) It (Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 693
[28 P.2d 916]1 see 16 Cal.L.Rev. 363, 366.) In the present
case appellant's claim for back salary tended to diminish or
defeat the union'. recovery of money damagea a.llepdq ....
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tamed by the detention of its books, records, and papers. Such
a claim was also a proper subject of a cross-complaint. Seetion 442 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Whenever
the defendant seeks affirmative relief against any party, relating to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, matter
••• or accident upon which the action is brought, or affecting the property to which the action relates, he may, in addition to his answer, tile at the same time, or by permission of the
court subsequently, a cross-complaint." Respondents contend
that the amended complaint and the cross-complaint did not
relate to the same transaction, on the ground that the amended
complaint merely alleged that the union was the owner of the
books, records and papers mentioned in the action, that defendant had possession thereof, that he refused to deliver possession to the union, and that it did not mention that appellant
was the treasurer of the union or that he was removed from
his office. [8] It is settled, however, that "The manner in
which the complaint is drawn is not conclusive. The facts
surrounding the cause of action and not the form of complaint are determinative of what constitutes the transaction.
(Hanes v. Ooffee, 212 CaL 777 [300 P. 963] ; Story &; Isham
Oom. Co. v. Story, 100 Ca1. 31 [34 P. 671]; Terry Trading
Co. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428 [292 P. 474].)" (California Trust
00. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 625 [17 P.2d 297]; Marlin v. Hall,
219 Cal. 334, 337 [26 P.2d 288].) In the present case the
facts underlying the action for recovery of the books, records,
and papers of the union, and for money damages were the
same as those on which appellant based his claim for baek
salary, namely, appellant's removal from office and his refusal
to concede that the union could deprive him of the benefits
thereof within the specified term for which he was elected.
The trial court's decision to strike appellant's counterclaim
and cross-complaint denied appellant a trial of his claim for
damages for breach of contract. This claim involves issues of
fact, and we cannot determine the merits of the claim on this
appeal without depriving the parties of their right to a trial
of these issues. Moreover, the question whether appellant has
a claim for damages for breach of contract has not been
briefed by the parties. The briefs relate only to appellant'.
right to reinstatement to the office and the claim for back
salary that would follow from the existence of such right.
[9] There is no merit in respondent's contention that appellant baa failed to exhaust his rem.ediea within the

I
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Article XVI of the constitution and by-laws of the international uuion provides that" Any officer or member who has a
grievance or believes an injustice has been done in any way in
any local union may appeal to the General Executive Board."
Pursuant to this provision, appellant appealed from the decision of the union vacating his office, and his appeal was unconditionally denied. It would be futile to appeal to the same
board for damages on the ground that his removal from office
constituted a breach of contract. (Nissen v. International
Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028 [295 N.W. 858, 141 A.L.R. 598];
Lo Blanco v. Cushing, 115 N.J.Eq. 558 [171 A. 778]; Heasley
v. Operative Plasterers ~ Cement Finishers' International
Assn., 324 Pa. 257 [188 A. 206] ; see 168 A.L.R. 1473.)
In case No. S. F. 17577 (mandamus proceeding) the judgment and order denying the motion to vacate the judgment
are affirmed. In case No. S. F. 17248 (action on behalf of
the union) the judgment is reversed with directions to allow
the filing of defendant's counterclaim and cross-complaint and
to proceed to a trial of the single issue of defendant's claim
for back salary.

)

)

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 24 194-7.

